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preparation of specified information rela-
tive to the proposed rule action, public
notice, a public hearing, and publication
in the California Code of Regulations.
This bill would require Department poli-
cies, guidelines, rules, and documents not
subject to these rulemaking procedures to
be made reasonably available to state agen-
cies, state employees and their representa-
tives, and other interested parties. This pro-
vision, rather than the APA, would also
apply to the state Personnel Board for the
purposes of adopting, amending, and repeal-
ing civil service classifications in accor-
dance with the California Constitution.
This bill would continue all Department
regulations, policies, guidelines, rules,
and documents in effect on the effective
date of this article until they are amended
or repealed, as specified. [S. GO]
SB 235 (Hughes). Existing law estab-
lishes procedures for the enforcement of
child support obligations through the
courts and through state and local agen-
cies. Under existing law, the state Depart-
ment of Social Services is the administra-
tor of the state plan for securing child and
spousal support and determining pater-
nity. Existing law requires each county to
maintain a unit in the office of the district
attorney for the same purposes. As intro-
duced February 7, this bill would establish
the Division of Child Support Enforce-
ment in OAL, and would provide for the
administrative adjudication of child sup-
port obligations. The bill would establish
procedures for hearings to establish child
support and paternity, the enforcement
and modification of support obligations so
established, and for judicial review of
final orders issued by an administrative
law judge. [S. Jud]
BUREAU OF
STATE AUDITS
State Auditor: Kurt Sjoberg
(916) 445-0255
( reated by SB 37 (Maddy) (Chapter
12, Statutes of 1993), the Bureau of
State Audits (BSA) is an auditing and in-
vestigative agency under the direction of
the Commission on California State Gov-
ernment Organization and Economy (Lit-
tle Hoover Commission). SB 37 delegated
to BSA most of the duties previously per-
formed by the Office of Auditor General,
such as examining and reporting annually
upon the financial statements prepared by
the executive branch of the state, perform-
ing other related assignments (such as per-
formance audits) that are mandated by
statute, and administering the Reporting
of Improper Governmental Activities Act,
Government Code section 10540 et seq.
BSA is also required to conduct audits of
state and local government requested by
the Joint Legislative Audit Committee
(JLAC) to the extent that funding is avail-
able. BSA is headed by the State Auditor,
appointed by the Governor to a four-year
term from a list of three qualified individ-
uals submitted by JLAC.
The Little Hoover Commission reviews
reports completed by the Bureau and makes
recommendations to the legislature, the
Governor, and the public concerning the
operations of the state, its departments, sub-
divisions, agencies, and other public entities;
oversees the activities of BSA to ensure its
compliance with specified statutes; and re-
views the annual audit of the State Audit
Fund created by SB 37.
* MAJOR PROJECTS
The Department of Health Services'
Information On Drug Treatment Autho-
rization Requests (February 1995) is the
eighth in a series of semiannual reports by
BSA concerning the way the Department
of Health Services (DHS) processes drug
treatment authorization requests (TARs)
for certain prescribed drugs under the
Medi-Cal program [14:4 CRLR 15; 14:2&3
CRLR 13; 14:1 CRLR 15]; this report fo-
cuses on drug TARs processed from June
1994 through November 1994. During
this six-month period, DHS processed
214,303 drug TARs, a 177% increase in
requests since the first six-month period
reviewed; according to BSA, this increase
is largely due to changes in the governing
code. BSA found that DHS was not able
to process the drug TARs in a timely man-
ner and a backlog of 2,344 requests devel-
oped by November 1994. Ten pharmacists
contacted by BSA reported experiencing
processing delays, but also reported that
patient care was not affected because the
pharmacists filled the patients' prescrip-
tions in advance of receiving the TAR
approval. Also, 79 new positions were
added in DHS' drug TAR processing units
in October 1994 due to the increase of
drug TARs received during this period.
Orange County: Treasurer's Invest-
ment Strategy Was Excessively Risky
and Violated the Public Trust (March
1995) is BSA's audit of the Orange County
Treasurer's Office; the County Treasurer-
Tax Collector is an elected official, serves
a four-year term, and is responsible for
receiving, investing, and keeping safe all
funds belonging to the County and other
monies deposited with the Treasurer. BSA
found that during the 1990s, the Treasurer
sacrificed his portfolio's safety and liquid-
ity in a futile attempt to maintain yields;
as a result of his failed strategies, the
County's investment portfolio ultimately
lost $1.69 billion, the County filed for
bankruptcy protection on December 6,
1994, and critical public services are in
jeopardy throughout Orange County.
In addition to managing County mon-
ies from such sources as property taxes,
the Treasurer also manages the monies of
approximately 190 public agencies, in-
cluding cities, special districts, and school
districts; the vast majority of these agen-
cies are within Orange County. BSA found
that the former Treasurer pursued an in-
vestment strategy that placed the funds of
the 190 participants in his portfolio at
unnecessary risk. For example, the Trea-
surer excessively utilized short-term re-
verse repurchase agreements to leverage
his portfolio, and purchased highly vola-
tile, long-term structured notes with the
proceeds in an attempt to capture higher
yields. In a reverse repurchase (or "reverse
repo") agreement, the owner of a security,
such as the County, "borrows" by selling
the security to an investment broker with
an agreement to repurchase it a short time
later and to pay a stipulated interest rate as
the cost of borrowing the money. The se-
curity owner can then use the cash re-
ceived, leveraging the original principal
by, in effect, investing the same money
twice. If the cost of borrowing is less than
the earnings on the investment, then the
reverse repo transaction is beneficial to the
security owner. To maintain a high rate of
earning, and to cover the interest pay-
ments, the Treasurer invested in long-
range investments with higher interest
rates. Interest rates rose in 1994, causing
borrowing costs to increase and the value
of the investments to decline; the leverag-
ing strategy thus failed.
Among other things, BSA also found
that the Treasurer violated the public trust
in two ways. First, he altered County ac-
counting records for investment pool in-
terest earnings. As a result, the County's
general fund received approximately $93
million more in interest earnings than it
was entitled to receive from the invest-
ment portfolio. Second, the Treasurer vio-
lated the public trust by shifting nearly
$300 million in losses incurred by specific
investments of the County to all portfolio
investors.
BSA made the following recommen-
dations to the Orange County Board of
Supervisors to assist it in formulating a
corrective action plan for the future:
- The Board of Supervisors should di-
rect the Treasurer's Office to prepare a
comprehensive investment policy that es-
tablishes safe investment guidelines by
limiting the use of risky investments and
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ensuring yield, diversification, and liquid-
ity; specifies authority and accountability
over investment practices; requires a quar-
terly Treasurer's report to the Board of Su-
pervisors; requires a competitive bidding
process for brokers and dealers; creates an
investment advisory committee indepen-
dent of the Treasurer's Office; and limits
the use of reverse repurchase agreements
to 5% of the portfolio.
* The Board of Supervisors should es-
tablish strict rules governing ethics, con-
flict of interest, and asset safekeeping for
all the County's investment activities.
- The Board should rectify the misal-
locations of interest and losses.
BSA also noted that the Government
Code allows local government investment
officers wide latitude in their investment
practices, and recommended that the legisla-
ture amend state law to assure that local
government investment problems like those
in Orange County do not recur by requir-
ing written investment policies for all local
governing bodies to ensure that safety and
liquidity are paramount to yield; limiting
the use of reverse repurchase agreements
to 20% of the portfolio and only for spec-
ified purposes; establishing and defining
a "prudent person rule" which details the
fiduciary responsibilities and level of ex-
pertise expected of local investment offi-
cers; requiring investment reports, at least
quarterly, to the governing body and in-
vestment participants; and prohibiting the
issuance of taxable or nontaxable debt for
speculation or risk arbitrage investment
purposes.
The Medical Board Needs To Maxi-
mize Its Recovery of Costs (March 1995)
is BSA's audit of the enforcement and disci-
plinary system administered by the Division
of Medical Quality (DMQ) within the Med-
ical Board of California (MBC), as required
by SB 916 (Presley) (Chapter 1267, Statutes
of 1993). [13:4 CRLR 54-56] DMQ re-
ceives, screens, and formally investigates
complaints and reports of physician mis-
conduct; completed investigations are for-
warded to the Health Quality Enforcement
Section (HQES) of the Attorney General's
Office, a unit of attorneys who specialize
in prosecuting medical discipline cases.
BSA's review focused on DMQ/HQES en-
forcement and disciplinary activities that
occurred during fiscal years 1992-93 and
1993-94. As a result of its review, BSA
reached the following conclusions:
- MBC is not maximizing its efforts to
recover the costs of its enforcement and
disciplinary system. Effective January 1,
1993, Business and Professions Code sec-
tion 125.3 gave MBC the authority to re-
quest administrative law judges (ALJs) to
direct physicians found to have violated
the Medical Practice Act to reimburse the
Board for its reasonable costs of investi-
gation and enforcement of their respective
cases up to dates of their hearings; in ad-
dition, MBC is not precluded from recov-
ering costs incurred for investigation and
enforcement of cases resolved through
stipulated settlements. During fiscal year
1993-94, MBC spent more than $25 mil-
lion on enforcement and disciplinary ef-
forts; of those costs, BSA determined that
MBC could have attempted to recover
more than $6.3 million. However, MBC
recovered only $94,053 of its costs for that
period.
- Prior to January 1, 1995, HQES and
MBC had no way of knowing whether the
Board was paying for necessary and rea-
sonable services actually rendered by HQES
on its behalf, because neither MBC nor
HQES maintained a system to identify the
type of activities HQES performed for
MBC. Effective January 1, 1995, the At-
torney General's Office finally enhanced
its Legal Time Reporting System in order
to comply with SB 2038 (McCorquodale)
(Chapter 1273, Statutes of 1994), which
requires the AG to provide itemized state,
ments of services rendered to agencies to
which it provides legal representation. [14:4
CRLR 21]
- Finally, the Department of General
Services' Office of Administrative Hear-
ings (OAH), whose ALJs preside over phy-
sician discipline hearings, overcharged
MBC for services provided by hearing
reporters and failed to reimburse the
Board for the costs of some transcripts. As
a result, BSA estimates that OAH owes
MBC approximately $283,000. In addi-
tion, BSA determined that OAH also owes
MBC an undetermined amount for the
cost of transcripts and copies of transcripts
ordered by third parties for appealed cases
from January 1, 1991 through June 30,
1994.
BSA made the following recommen-
dation to ensure that MBC maximizes its
recovery of costs:
- MBC should be more aggressive in
recovering disciplinary costs through stip-
ulated settlements and as part of proposed
disciplinary decisions rendered by ALJs.
- MBC should include in its recovery
the costs of prosecuting cases, administer-
ing psychiatric examinations, and a por-
tion of the administrative costs of its Di-
version Program for substance-abusing
physicians that represents the number of
participants ordered to participate in the
program as an alternative to other disci-
plinary action. The Board disagreed with
BSA regarding recovery of costs from the
diversion program; according to MBC,
these costs should be evaluated on a case-
by-case basis depending on a physician's
ability to pay.
- Finally, MBC should seek a change
in the Business and Professions Code to
allow the recovery of disciplinary costs
incurred once the administrative hearing
process begins.
B SA also recommended that the Attor-
ney General require supervisors in each
HQES office to review the number of
hours and types of tasks for which attor-
neys and legal assistants are charging to
assure MBC that the hours charged are
reasonable and necessary. Also, MBC
should develop its own procedure for re-
viewing invoices received from the Attor-
ney General's Office.
To avoid overcharging MBC in the
future and to compensate the Board for
past overcharges, BSA recommended that
OAH compute the future hours worked by
private court reporters in tenths of hours;
recompute all hours worked by private
court reporters since January 1993 using
tenths of hours and reimburse MBC for the
amount of the overcharges; reinitiate the
practice of quarterly reimbursement of
MBC for the amounts collected for tran-
scripts ordered by third parties; review
invoices received for transcripts ordered
by third parties not involving appealed
cases that were received from January 1,
1993 through January 31, 1995, and reim-
burse MBC for the total amount collected
on its behalf; and review invoices received
for transcripts of appealed cases ordered
by third parties that were received from
January 1, 1991 through June 30, 1994,
and reimburse MBC for the amount OAH
failed to collect from third parties as re-
quired by law.
State Architect: Contracting Prac-
tices Need Improvement (March 1995)
is BSA's audit of the Division of the State
Architect (DSA) within the Department of
General Services, as required by the Bud-
get Act of 1994. This review focused on
whether DSA complied with state con-
tracting laws and regulations in awarding
its contracts; BSA also looked at DSA's
involvement in the seismic upgrading of
the Armory and Ahmanson buildings
owned by the California Museum of Sci-
ence and Industry.
The report concludes that DSA did not
always comply with state requirements
when procuring architectural, engineer-
ing, construction, and other services. BSA
found numerous instances in the museum
upgrade where DSA did not follow proper
procedures before awarding contracts, did
not always prepare independent estimates
before it negotiated fees, and did not fol-
low the proper building codes. BSA rec-
ommended that DSA take full advantage
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of the competitive bidding process by pre-
paring estimates and advertising con-
tracts. BSA also recommended that DSA
take certain steps to ensure that it does not
expose the state to potential financial lia-
bility for work performed if the contract is
not approved.
Department of Social Services: Re-
view and Assessment of the Cost Effec-
tiveness of AFDC Fraud Detection Pro-
grams (March 1995). The Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) pro-
gram provides cash grants to children and
their parents or guardians whose income
is insufficient to meet the children's basic
needs. Under the general oversight of the
Department of Social Services (DSS),
AFDC Fraud Detection and Prevention Pro-
grams are administered at the local level by
each of the 58 county welfare departments
and district attorney's offices. This audit by
BSA of the cost-effectiveness of AFDC
fraud detection programs is required by the
Budget Act of 1994 (Chapter 139, Statutes
of 1994). The audit concluded that early and
continuing fraud programs are clearly cost-
effective, but found that DSS could improve
its management and oversight activities.
BSA reviewed the performance of seven
counties and this report details the results
on six of those counties: Los Angeles,
Mendocino, Merced, Riverside, Shasta,
and Tuolumne. The results of the seventh
county, San Bernardino, were non-quanti-
fiable due to errors by the County in pre-
paring the Fraud Investigation Activity
Report. B SA found that the counties' early
and continuing fraud programs are clearly
cost-effective. The program returns be-
tween $6-$67 in fraud costs avoided to
state, federal, and county governments for
every $1 spent for early fraud prevention
and detection activities; the program re-
turns between $3-$12 in fraud costs avoided
to state, federal, and county governments
for every $1 spent for continuing fraud
prevention and detection activities. River-
side County was the most cost-effective
county reviewed, primarily due to its pre-
ventive fraud investigations in which it
investigates welfare applicants.
BSA's audit found that all the counties
committed errors in their reporting and
accumulation of fraud activity data, in-
cluding the use of inadequate and outdated
information; these errors made BSA's cal-
culations less precise, but are not likely to
affect the overall conclusions of the audit.
Although the AFDC fraud programs ap-
pear to be cost-effective, BSA found that
significant improvement could be realized
with improved management and oversight
by DSS. BSA made the following recom-
mendations to improve management and
oversight:
- DSS should ensure that accurate,
timely, and relevant fraud information is
gathered from the counties that is needed
to manage the program and is cost-benefi-
cial to gather.
- DSS should develop performance
measures to help evaluate the effective-
ness of the various fraud programs, tech-
niques, and investigators.
- DSS should strengthen its monitor-
ing of the counties receiving enhanced
funding for the utilization of the statewide
matching system to ensure their compli-
ance.
Department of Social Services: The
Department's Approach To Welfare
Automation Is Too Costly and Unlikely
To Succeed (April 1995) is BSA's audit of
the welfare automation system being im-
plemented by DSS; as required by the
1994-95 Budget Act. The Welfare and
Institutions Code requires DSS to imple-
ment a Statewide Automated Welfare Sys-
tem (SAWS) for the following public as-
sistance programs: AFDC, food stamps,
Medi-Cal, aid for the adoption of children,
special adult programs, and-where feasi-
ble-social services programs. Although
in 1984 DSS planned to complete SAWS
by June 1990, it has yet to be implemented.
DSS has set no date for completing state-
wide automation, and is not required to
have a schedule under applicable law.
The purpose of BSA's review was to
evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency
of DSS' approach to statewide automa-
tion. The review included the evaluation
of two completed pilot projects devel-
oped by Napa and Merced counties, and
an assessment of a third welfare automa-
tion project being developed by Los An-
geles County. BSA also examined DSS'
strategy and evaluation plan for a pilot
system in fourteen small- to medium-
sized counties known as the Interim
Statewide Automated Welfare System
(ISAWS). Nine of the fourteen ISAWS
counties are in various stages of instal-
lation, with the remaining five counties
to begin later this year.
BSA projected that DSS will spend
$166 million to automate the fourteen
counties; projected costs for statewide au-
tomation may exceed $1 billion, or $455
million over DSS' original budget esti-
mates. Also, some of the savings expected
by DSS from automation may not be at-
tainable, and may not be sufficient to re-
cover projected costs for nearly ten years.
According to BSA, the approach cho-
sen for automating the fourteen ISAWS
counties is unlikely to succeed as a cost-
effective approach to statewide welfare
automation. Administrative cost savings
of $231,000 during fiscal year 1993-94 in
Napa County are below what should be
expected after the system was implemented.
The annual cost of keeping the application
software up-to-date with welfare laws is
$6.8 million and increasing; a backlog of
requested rules and other changes to the
software may take $3 million to resolve,
and indicates that the underlying software
is difficult to maintain. BSA also found
that the Napa software may not be suitable
to accommodate a high volume of trans-
actions and records, is based on a propri-
etary system not suitable for competitive
procurement statewide, and is inefficient.
BSA noted that the state is bearing the
full risk for ensuring that the ISAWS
counties' software performs as originally
planned. However, DSS is not requiring
that the software vendor and maintenance
supplier meet system availability and re-
sponse time standards, and has not estab-
lished a fixed price to meet performance
objectives; as a result, DSS does not know
what the final price will be for the ISAWS
counties' hardware and software.
According to BSA, support for the
ISAWS automation approach is waning.
Counties believe that DSS and the federal
government have been unwilling to allow
counties to pursue viable alternatives. In
California, other welfare automation sys-
tems, such as the system developed by
Merced County, compare favorably with
the SAWS in place in Napa County. The
Merced system has already been paid for
by the state and is in the public domain;
annual net cost savings in Merced County
are estimated at $5 million. Also, Merced
County reduced its total 1993-94 costs per
case by 55% since 1989-90, the largest
reduction of any county in California over
the same period.
A proposed system for Los Angeles
County also compares favorably with the
SAWS system in place in Napa County.
Though no contract has yet been signed to
deliver the system, planned commitments
are to implement the system in 42 months.
The total projected costs, including County
actual and projected costs, are less than the
costs of the ISAWS for four times as many
cases. The contract being negotiated now
to produce the Los Angeles County sys-
tem will require the contractor to meet
specified and measurable performance
targets for the system, provide for penal-
ties and damages for failure to meet these
targets, and establish a fixed-price bid.
BSA found that, in organizing and
conducting its activities to provide wel-
fare automation to counties, DSS has
failed to deliver a statewide system. The
results of BSA's review, which included
activities from 1984-95, indicate the
need for substantial changes in how
1
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DSS is organized and how it performs its
responsibilities for welfare automation.
According to BSA, the complexity of this
project has overwhelmed DSS' ability to
manage it. BSA estimates that statewide
welfare automation may not be available
until 2000, ten years after DSS' original
plans forSAWS.
Specifically, BSA noted the following
problems in the SAWS project: DSS has
no strategic plan for statewide welfare au-
tomation; DSS has not developed measur-
able objectives, and as a result is unable to
measure the effectiveness of the project;
DSS has not established an effective cost
accounting or reporting system for the
welfare automation efforts, and as a result
is unable to tell the legislature how much
has been spent; DSS placed the SAWS
branch chief at too low a level to command
authority and accountability, and has had
six changes in the branch chief in the last
eight years; DSS has not prepared a risk
assessment plan and does not share risks
of the project with vendors providing the
ISAWS; DSS has not complied with leg-
islative and administrative reporting re-
quirements; DSS has not provided the
legislature with a complete cost estimate
for the ISAWS, and continually underesti-
mates costs of statewide automation; DSS
has made, and is planning, expensive and
unnecessary enhancements to the ISAWS;
DSS does not have an evaluation plan for
the ISAWS which would result in a recom-
mendation to continue with or to cease the
ISAWS; and DSS does not properly utilize
outside expertise where staff do not have
the specialized skills to meet a specific
need. Also, there has been no independent
validation or verification of the project's
progress, budget, or performance.
BSA made the following recommen-
dations:
- The legislature should limit welfare
automation funding for fiscal year 1995-
96 to six months until certain conditions
are met and certain information is known.
- DSS should competitively bid the
statewide implementation of welfare auto-
mation.
- DSS should improve its management
of welfare automation.
- The legislature should consider con-
tinued independent review of welfare au-
tomation.
State of California: Financial Report
Year Ended June 30,1994 (April 1995) is
BSA's financial report for the state pre-
pared pursuant to Government Code sec-
tion 8546.4. The financial statements show
that the state's general fund generated ap-
proximately $1.1 billion more in revenues
than it spent for the fiscal year ended June
30, 1994. However, the general fund still
ended the fiscal year with a fund deficit of
$1.1 billion.
Other Reports. Since January, BSA
has also released the following reports:
The State's Use of Transportation Funds
Allowed by the 1989 Transportation Blue-
print Legislation (January 1995); Investi-
gations of Improper Governmental Ac-
tivities from August 1, 1994 through
December 31, 1994 (February 1995); A
Review of the State's Bond Sales for
1993 and 1994 (March 1995); and State
of California: Statement of Securities
Accountability of the State Treasurer's
Office (April 1995).
* LEGISLATION
SB 477 (Maddy). Existing law speci-
fies that the head of BSA is the State
Auditor who shall be appointed by the
Governor from a list of the three qualified
individuals submitted by the Joint Legis-
lative Audit Committee. As amended
March 23, this bill specifies that the three
qualified individuals be nominated by that
Committee.
Under existing law, whenever a state
agency is authorized by special or gen-
eral statute to fix the salary of an em-
ployee, the salary is subject only to the
approval of the Department of Person-
nel Administration before it becomes ef-
fective and payable, except for the sala-
ries paid to state court and judicial em-
ployees; consistent with this authority,
the State Auditor may fix the compensa-
tion of the employees working under
his/her charge. This bill would instead
provide that consistent with authority to
establish and administer the personnel
policies and practices of BSA without
oversight or approval of the Department,
the State Auditor may employ and fix
the compensation of BSA personnel.
Existing law specifies that persons em-
ployed by BSA shall be allowed to enroll
in civil service employee benefit pro-
grams. This bill would specify that those
employees shall be allowed to enroll in
Public Employees' Medical and Hospital
Care Act programs.
Existing law specifies that there shall
be appropriated annually in the Budget
Act to the State Audit Fund the amount
necessary to reimburse the State Audit
Fund for the cost of audits to be per-
formed. This bill would also authorize the
State Auditor to directly bill state agencies
for the costs of specified audits of the
executive branch.
Existing law authorizes the State Audi-
tor or his/her authorized representative to
have access to the records and property of
any public entity being audited or investi-
gated to the same extent that employees or
officers of that agency or public entity
have access. This bill would extend that
authority to include access to the records
of any private entity or person subject to
review or regulation by the public agency
or public entity being audited to the extent
that the agency employees have that ac-
cess.
Existing law specifies the require-
ments of an administrative subpoena in
order for a governmental agency to obtain
financial records. This bill would exempt
the State Auditor from these specific re-
quirements when he/she issues a subpoena
for financial records of financial institu-
tions.
Existing law exempts the State Audi-
tor from supervision by certain state con-
trol agencies that would otherwise be
applicable. This bill would, subject to
the California Constitution, delegate au-
thority to the State Auditor to establish
and administer BSA's personnel policies
and practices, and would permit the par-
ticipation of BSA officers and employ-
ees in benefits programs administered
by the Department of Personnel Admin-
istration, as specified, at the election of
the State Auditor.
This bill would specifically authorize
the State Auditor to audit accounts and
records necessary for proper reporting
under the federal Single Audit Act of
1984.
Existing law requires the State Auditor,
in conjunction with an annual audit of
state financial statements, to test compli-
ance with internal state auditing require-
ments and to report to the legislature, the
Governor, and respective governmental
entities on the significant variances from
the general and specific standards for the
professional practice of internal auditing.
This bill would delete this requirement.
[A. CPGE&ED]
SB 974 (Alquist, Johnston, Killea,
Leonard, Mello, O'Connell). Under the
State Government Strategic Planning
and Performance Review Act, the Depart-
ment of Finance-in consultation with
the Controller, BSA, and the Legislative
Analyst-is required to develop a plan for
conducting performance reviews of all
state agencies. As amended May 15, this
bill would create the Performance Audit
Joint Task Force, consisting of the Gover-
nor and the Controller, that would be re-
quired to periodically identify the execu-
tive branch agencies, programs, or prac-
tices that are likely to benefit from perfor-
mance audits. The bill would provide that
agencies, programs, or practices that are
so identified would be in addition to those
otherwise identified under the Act. [A.
CPGE&ED]
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